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This paper examines the impact of the 2016 European Union (EU) referendum and its
aftermath from the perspective of European migrants living in Wales. Drawing on
interviews conducted with EU nationals in 2016 and 2017, the article highlights
various examples of hostility and violence encountered by these migrants during
and after the referendum campaign, demonstrating the longstanding nature of hostile
experiences. It further outlines the uncertainty and insecurity experienced during this
period, noting how Brexit affected not only EU migrants' rights and entitlements but
also their settlement and sense of identity and belonging. The analysis sheds light on
various negative emotions and reactions triggered by the referendum, illustrating the
diversity of migrants' experiences. Highlighting the multiple and complex ways in
which the referendum affected the migrants, the article argues that Brexit should
be understood as an ongoing process of “othering” and unsettling.
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The United Kingdom's (UK) 2016 European Union (EU) membership
referendum (“the referendum” henceforth) was primarily a vote on
attitudes towards immigration; little of the campaign focused on other
issues of EU membership (e.g., common policies and single market).
Immigration provided the most political capital; successive opinion
polls and surveys have emphasised the prominence given to this issue
by U.K. voters (Ipsos Mori, 2016; Ford & Lymperopoulou, 2016), and
research has shown that the British right wing media display a partic-
ularly negative and aggressive hostility towards migrants and refugees
in comparison with other western European countries (Gerard, 2016;
Berry, Garcia‐Blanco, & Moore, 2015). Although migration was often
discussed during the referendum campaign and commentators
outlined the implications of various potential outcomes for EU citizens- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
e Creative Commons Attribution Li
published by John Wiley & Sonsliving in the UK and vice versa, the voices and perspectives of migrants
themselves have been largely missing in these debates.
Migrants' perspectives are important especially as they are the
most affected by the referendum result. European migrants, in particu-
lar, are affected by Brexit, questioning the rights and freedoms afforded
by EU citizenship and bringing uncertainty over what future status
these migrants to the UK will have and what conditions may be placed
on remaining. Much of the current media and political discourses in the
UK have focused on Europeanmigrants' onwardmigration (“Brexodus”)
and its potential impact on the British economy and society (Swinford,
2017; Travis, 2017), with little consideration given to the implication of
the referendum's impact for EU migrants themselves, especially those
who have built their lives and livelihoods in the UK over the years. Such
preoccupation with the theme of movement further extends into the
academic field; as Ryan (2018, p. 234) notes, many studies have been- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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2 of 10 GUMA AND DAFYDD JONESdominated by a “mobility lens” that privileges circularity, temporariness,
and mobility, paying little attention to processes of settlement and
belonging among European migrants. We agree that examinations of
the continuing and developing ways in which people maintain and
renew connections with localities and people are needed. Understand-
ing these processes is particularly pertinent in the context of a climate
of hostility following the referendum. This paper builds on emerging
literature on Brexit and EU migration by drawing on experiences of a
range of different migrant groups. Although existing studies have
focused either on a specific nationality, such as Polish migrants
(McGhee, Moreh, & Vlachantoni, 2017; Rzepnikowska, 2018), or age
groups, such as young European migrants living in London (Lulle,
Moroşanu, & King, 2018), this paper draws on interviews with a diverse
range of European migrants as regards their nationality, “race”, ethnic-
ity, age, class, family status, and length of residence in the UK to inquire
into their perspectives on the unsettling and turbulent backdrop of the
referendum campaign and its aftermath.
We argue that the referendum intensified an already hostile
environment for (many) EU migrants. The campaign and its aftermath
furthered a process of “othering” and unsettling as manifest in increased
attacks on people and property, anxieties and uncertainties around
future rights, and complex tensions where belonging is contested
through formal and informal practices and processes. We begin by
outlining the existing research on (EU) migration in the next section,
locating it within the broader literature on belonging. Here, we also high-
light a need to acknowledge migrants' complex attachments to place,
rather than assuming temporality and mobility. The following section
discusses the Welsh case study, illustrating a need to examine Brexit
across the UK's diverse contexts. After outlining the methodology and
methods, we introduce the empirical findings, focusing on three major
themes that emerged from the data. The first part discusses various
examples of hostility and abuse experienced by the respondents that
undermined their connections to localities, showing how belonging was
contested on the everyday level. The second part examines various
emotional and affective reactions to Brexit, highlighting the diversity of
experiences among the migrants and the underpinning factors influenc-
ing their varied reactions. The last empirical section considers the
dilemmas and complexities of (non‐)belonging, showing how individuals
who had developed an attachment through connections such as work
and family or citizenship became unsettled due to Brexit and its legal
uncertainties, bringing tensions for individuals' identities and their sense
of personhood. In conclusion, we summarise the findings and reflect
on these various processes of “othering” and unsettling.2 | EUROPEAN MIGRATION—MOBILITY,
SETTLEMENT, AND BELONGING
Reflecting on the post‐2004 migration from “Eastern” to “Western”
Europe, Favell (2008) argued that “East European migrants are in fact
regional ‘free movers’ not immigrants and, with the borders open, they
are more likely to engage in temporary circular and transnational mobil-
ity, governed by the ebb and flow of economic demand, than by long‐
term permanent immigration and asylum seeking” (p. 703, emphasis in
original). This image of mobile “East European”1 migrants, constantly onthe move between UK and “home,” was reinforced by various studies
that documented their high levels of transnational movement and prac-
tices (Eade, Drinkwater, & Garapich, 2006; Engbersen & Snel, 2013;
Moskal, 2013; Pollard, Latorre, & Sriskandarajah, 2008; White, 2011).
Numerous surveys showed that a significant number of postaccession
migrants had no long‐term intention of settling in the UK or were uncer-
tain about their plans, leading some scholars to argue it would be more
appropriate to consider them as “temporary migrants” (Blanchflower &
Lawton, 2008). Yet research also showed that not all migrants had
short‐term intentions, as some planned to settle in the UK or changed
their plans over time, for example, coming for a short stay then “ending
up” staying in the country (Ryan, 2018;White & Ryan, 2008). These pro-
cesses of settlement and belonging have been studied focusing on Polish
migration to the UK. Researchers have explored the complex ways in
which these migrants have come to develop relationships with British
society, for example, through workplaces, schools, and neighbourhoods.
Grzymala‐Kazlowska (2018) describes Polish migrants' adaptation
and settlement in the UK as “anchoring,” by establishing various “foot-
holds” in the country while simultaneously maintaining links with
Polishness and Poland. Ryan (2018) employs the concept of “embedding”
to highlight how her Polish informants negotiated processes of settle-
ment and belonging over time. In highlighting the temporal and the
spatial and relational nature of belonging, these studies challenge the
idea that mobile migrants are somehow footloose and thus unable or
uninterested in settling in residence countries. Their findings lend
further weight to existing critiques that question common understand-
ings of mobility and belonging as “mutually exclusive” and that mobile
individuals are unable to develop or maintain a strong sense of territorial
belonging (Gustafson, 2009, p. 491).
European migration is further distinguished from other migration
forms due to EU citizens' legal status. EU citizenship provides EU
nationals with significant legal privileges and certainties, which affords
“free movement” rights that enable them to move freely within the EU
as it reduces or removes immigration barriers between member states.
While EU citizenship broadly gives rights and entitlements to EU
nationals on a par with British citizens, some restrictions such as
related to residency requirements and voting rights still apply. It does
so by placing “a thin layer of additional rights … on top of a thicker
national citizenship” (Bauböck, 2000, p. 310). EU citizenship thus
entails a sort of integration “by default” (Mügge & van der Haar,
2016, p. 82), offering a formal route that “opens the entrance doors”
(Wimmer, 2002, p. 251) for EU nationals to British society. Formal
membership constitutes an important condition for migrants' “effec-
tive participation” in the residence country, as do informal and emo-
tional elements of belonging (Anthias, 2016, p. 179).
In this sense, Brexit threatens EU migrants' rights and entitle-
ments but also their participation, settlement, and belonging in British
society. The debates around Brexit are about national belonging
(Virdee & McGeever, 2017), entailing struggles of classification
(Bourdieu, 1992) about who does and who does not belong in the
national community. The focus on immigration in debates during the
referendum campaign extended beyond that of migration from within
the EU—most notably evident in the display of notorious symbols such
as U.K. Independence Party's “breaking point” poster and the key
trope of “take back control”—and showed how these debates were
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populism (Burnett, 2017; Fox, 2016; Virdee & McGeever, 2017;
Winter, 2016). The rapid rise of hate crimes targeting migrants and
ethnic minorities in the UK since the referendum campaign began
has signalled an increase in antiimmigrant xenophobia and racism to
a frightening extent.
However, this questioning of European migrants' rights and
belonging is not a new phenomenon. Rather it has been an ongoing
process which occurred well before the referendum, taking place on
different levels. On the discursive level, it manifested in the continu-
ing, highly controversial debates about the impact of EU migration
on public services and society in more general. Much attention has
been directed at “Eastern Europeans” who have been subject to ongo-
ing hostility, stigmatisation, and racialisation by British media and
political discourses (Burrell, 2010; Fox, Moroşanu, & Szilassy, 2012;
Rzepnikowska, 2018). Such debates are well captured in the tropes
of “health tourism” and “benefit tourism” that have been common-
place in the UK's media and public discourse in the past years (Bentley,
Faulkner, & Borland, 2015; Bowater, 2010; Chapman, 2013; Hough &
Whitehead, 2011). These challenge the idea that the status of EU
nationals as “White, European, legal” migrants renders them some-
what “invisible” (Engbersen & Snel, 2013) and remind that migrants'
incorporation and belonging are context specific (Anthias, 2016);
they are dependent not only on migrants' status and entitlements in
the residence country but also shaped by societal reception (Portes
& Rumbaut, 1996) and by localities and neighbourhoods in which
migrants come to live (Rzepnikowska, 2018).
In terms of policy, measures introduced through the 2014 and
2016 Immigration Acts, as part of creating a “hostile environment”
for immigrants in the UK, included new regulations and requirements
that restricted the rights of European Economic Area nationals to
move and reside freely in the UK facilitating their removal from the
country (The AIRE Centre, 2017). At the same time, studies have also
shown how the questioning of EU citizens' rights and entitlements has
taken place beyond the level of policy and discourses as they are being
enacted in mundane practices and everyday interactions with British
state authorities. A study conducted in 2012 that focused on everyday
experiences of welfare provision among Czech and Slovak nationals in
Glasgow, for example, found how these nationals had their welfare
payments frequently “cancelled” and their ID documents retained by
U.K. welfare authorities, often without any explanation given (Guma,
2018). As well as hindering migrants' access to welfare and other state
services, these document retention practices also impeded their “free
movement” rights to cross national borders within the EU.
Brexit should thus be understood in this context of ongoing and
longstanding processes of “othering” of (some) European nationals in
the UK that has occurred on different levels. Such processes are not
necessarily uniform across the UK and may vary across its devolved
nations. Local contexts of Brexit need to be explored, rather than
assuming homogenous experiences across the UK common to all
groups (Anderson & Wilson, 2018). The different voting patterns of
the constituent countries demonstrate different attitudes towards
EU membership, whereas the UK's asymmetric constitutional
arrangements bring different policy contexts. Although immigration
and nationality are matters reserved to the U.K. government andparliament, devolved administrations have competence in a range
of fields affecting migrants' everyday lives (e.g., education,
healthcare, and housing). We move now to outline the specific con-
text of EU migration and Brexit in Wales.3 | WALES, EU MIGRATION, AND BREXIT
Wales has lower levels of migration than the UK average. According to
the 2011 census, 5.5% of its population of three million inhabitants
were born outside the UK (compared with 12.7% across the UK),
and 95.6% of its population is categorised as White (compared with
87.2% across the UK). Around 50,000 residents (1.7%) in Wales hold
the citizenship of another EU state. Despite a self‐perception of being
a “tolerant nation,” numerous studies have presented accounts of
minority groups in Wales receiving hostility and abuse (Jackson &
Dafydd Jones, 2014; Williams, 2003). Indeed, Mann and Tommis
(2012) note a polarisation of views on immigration in Wales, with a
higher ratio of negative accounts than any other U.K. region. Xeno-
phobia in Wales is multidimensional, with anti‐English sentiments
prevalent and widely accepted in casual settings (Williams, 2003),
and abuse towards immigrants and ethnic and religious minorities out-
side the more diverse metropolitan areas surrounding Cardiff, New-
port, and Swansea are well documented (Crawley & Crimes, 2009;
Robinson, 2003; Robinson & Gardner, 2004). Yet there is also empiri-
cal evidence that immigrants and in‐migrants have felt welcomed,
appreciated, and accepted (Dafydd Jones, 2015), and these more
nuanced—and contradictory—accounts should not be overlooked.
Wales voted to leave the EU with a similar margin as whole of
the UK. Voting patterns did not conform to clear linguistic or
urban/rural divisions, although areas that had benefitted from EU
structural funds due to low gross domestic product tended to sup-
port leaving. Evidence presented by Wyn Jones (2017) suggests that
those who had both a strong Welsh identity and a strong British
identity were more likely to vote to leave the EU, rather than those
with only a strong Welsh identity, which often places Wales in a
multilingual, multination Europe (Osmond, 1995; Wyn Jones, 2007).
This differs from England where those with a strong English identity
were most likely to vote to leave and those with a strong British
identity to remain. Furthermore, the EU has been central to Wales'
economic development: in the past decades West Wales and the
Valleys received structural funds due to its weak economy, and the
single market is the destination for 59.8% of the country's exports
(Welsh Government, 2017). Although it seems surprising that most
Welsh voters in the referendum supported leaving the EU, specific
Welsh impacts were rarely addressed in the run‐up to the vote
due to a weak public sphere. Unlike in Scotland and Northern Ire-
land, there is no Welsh version of British “national” daily newspa-
pers, and the only “national” Welsh newspaper, the Western Mail,
has a low readership; the most widely read is the Daily Mail, noted
for its negative portrayal of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers
(Gerard, 2016). Consequently, it appears unsurprising that Wales
embodies such contradictions: reliant on EU membership, but voting
against it; seeking a hospitable inclusivity, but also being hostile
towards migrants.
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This paper presents findings from qualitative research conducted
with EU migrants living in Wales between February 2016 and October
2017, covering the period before and after the referendum. The
study explored various ways in which these migrants engaged in civil
society organisations and activities in different parts of Wales, forming
part of a wider research programme on civil society. The paper draws
on interviews conducted with 42 respondents involved in various
initiatives and organisations in a range of localities across Wales
that included major cities, post‐industrial towns, and rural settlements.
The interviews were supplemented by data in the form of participant
observation in several events and activities attended by these migrants
during this period. Although most respondents came from central
Europe, the research sample also included Portuguese nationals,
whose inclusion was informed by fieldwork; we found organisations
that involved or catered for both central European and Portuguese‐
speaking migrants. Other commonalities between these migrants
included arriving in Wales through recruitment agencies and working
in similar jobs.
The resulting research sample consisted of a diverse group of
EU citizens: 18 came from Poland, and others were from Slovakia,
Czechia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Portugal. The Slovak and
Czech respondents also included Roma individuals, and a few
Portuguese nationals came from African countries such as Mozambique.
The sample included 23 women and 19 men aged between 22 and 68.
Many2 worked in low‐paid and demanding jobs such as factory work,
hospitality, social care, and in the charity sector, alongside running or
participating in civil society groups and activities. Moreover, partici-
pants also varied considerably in terms of their length of stay in
Wales/UK although many had come to the UK after 2004 (four
respondents had arrived since 2011), the sample also included individ-
uals who had arrived prior to this period, with three participants
having lived in the UK for over 45 years. The total span of arrival dates
in Wales/UK ranged from 1968 to 2015.
The interviews were conducted in English; however, respondents
were invited to express themselves in their own native language if
they were unable to communicate certain words or expressions in
English. The fact that one of the researchers was a “fellow migrant”
and a nonnative English speaker (proficient in Slovak) may have also
helped the interviewees to understand themselves as equal partners
in the communication. The interviews were open ended, allowing
participants to talk freely and openly about their participation and
experiences in Wales. The interviews were recorded with participants'
consent and transcribed verbatim; data were analysed with NVivo and
coded in a “bottom‐up” manner, drawing out relevant themes and
issues and their interconnections.35 | HOSTILITY, ABUSE, AND VIOLENCE
Respondents' accounts revealed a negative reaction to the referen-
dum and its result. Many gave examples of various incidents that they
or their family had experienced, especially in the immediate aftermath
of the vote. These took a range of different forms, including verbalabuse, physical violence, and vandalism. Monika, a 39‐year‐old Polish
respondent who owned a Polish delicatessen, described how her shop
was attacked in the referendum's aftermath:Here [in the town] I had a broken sign. … That was
destroyed one week. The next week it was … all the
flowers were taken out from the big tub which is in
front of the shop. All the soil and everything was on the
floor. Further down there was a few metres and they
didn't touch those flowers because they're a solicitor.
They only destroyed ours.Unlike the solicitors' office a few doors away, Monika, resident in
Wales for 11 years, felt that her shop was being targeted as a visible
manifestation of EU migration. Here, the shop sign serves as a “marker
of difference” (Rzepnikowska, 2018), which along with other markers
such as car registrations, satellite dishes, language, accents, and a
“foreign look” (p. 10) illustrate how the “whiteness” and “invisibility”
of Polish and more generally European migrants are contested and
constructed categories, rather than fixed.
Such hostile encounters were not, however, limited to people
perceived to be of “Eastern European” origin, which, as we have
noted, was the prime construct of the “other” during the referendum
campaign. Sonia, a Portuguese national, also reported how her café
was targeted in the aftermath of the Brexit vote:Before the people can think but they don't say it because
it's embarrassing to say what the people think. Now
because of Brexit everyone can say whatever they want
because they think it is fine. Yeah, and I've had broken
chairs, broken tables. Someone came here with a lead in
his hand to threaten me. I put in the court. I call the
Police because this is what they say I need to do, and
after the court do what? Give a suspended penalty.
Don't do nothing.Sonia encountered physical violence in the form of a threat with a
weapon and did not feel that she received justice due to the
suspended penalty her assailant received. In Sonia's case, the “markers
of difference” not only included her shop sign and accent but also her
(darker) skin colour. Some of the Portuguese‐speaking informants,
including Sonia, were of African descent who came from former
Portuguese colonies, such as Angola and Mozambique. Her example
makes clear the historical link between colonialism and migration
and the way in which EU citizenship extends beyond Europe, contrib-
uting to the diversity of the category of “EU citizen”: It includes not
only “White Europeans” (Engbersen & Snel, 2013) but also non‐White
individuals with different histories and migration trajectories who may
or may not come from Europe. Sonia also notes how hostility towards
immigrants became increasingly permissible during the referendum
campaign and its aftermath. Other respondents also shared her view
that the campaign had brought about an intensification in xenophobic
abuse aimed at migrants, a rapid rise that has also been documented
throughout the UK (Weaver, 2016).
Beyond the personal hostility or abuse they had experienced,
many respondents were aware of incidents happening elsewhere
through media coverage and expressed concerns also about the
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Monika listed several incidents involving Polish migrants, which were
reported widely in the media and on social networks:Yeah, but there was a lot of incidents. The Polish people
putting on Facebook, for example, someone's shed was
put on fire. There was a note, go back to your fucking
country or someone else had their … a little girl received
a little card and there was written, “when is your flight
back home?” You know, things like that. That's changed.
The people are looking differently on that. Whoever on
the referendum voted to leave … they are looking a bit
different. Their thinking is completely different, but
there is some people, like a lady from [the next‐door
shop] she came and sat down and was talking about
my [broken] sign. I read that in the newspaper and how
was the Brexit affecting you. Hopefully everything will
be fine. So she was very supportive.Monika juxtaposed the increased hostility with a growing sense of
solidarity from those who opposed the rhetoric associated with
the leave campaigns. These little acts of solidarity were also men-
tioned by other participants, with local residents offering messages
of support and welcoming statements to migrants and organisations
working with them, condemning the hostility towards migrants
and the rising number of hate crimes throughout Wales and the
UK. These hospitable encounters wishing to emphasise a sense of
welcome provided research participants with as sense of appreciation;
they are also evidence of a spirit of tolerance being at play during
these difficult times.
At the same time, respondents also highlighted experiences of
hostility in Wales as a longstanding and ongoing issue. Krysztof, a
38‐year‐old Polish respondent, was particularly upset at the verbal
abuse his children had received in school well before the EU referen-
dum took place:It's all the people, some nasty people who say go back to
your country … Lots of times they call my boys, “you
Polish twat” or something like that. Lots of comments
and sometimes the school will do nothing with that.
Three or four times they do that so we go straight to
some ladies group who run the school. We told come
down the policeman and try and explain but it's
happened again and again and again.His upset at the abuse his children received was compounded by a
frustration that despite these incidents recurring frequently, the
authorities had failed to take any action and tackle these issues.
Marcel, another Polish informant, also recounted similar experiences
that his children had encountered at school. These two informants
shared similar accounts despite living in different parts of Wales;
Krysztof lived in a small and relatively isolated town in mid‐Wales,
whereas Marcel resided in Cardiff, a city highlighted for its diversity
and multiculturalism.
The various examples of hostility and ongoing abuse highlighted
here show how the processes of “othering” EU nationals did occur
not only on the level of policy and discourses but also on the everydaylevel, through name‐calling, “reminders” such as “go back home” and
“why are you still here?”, or acts of vandalism (Rzepnikowska, 2018).
Although the aftermath of the referendum saw a considerable rise in
hate crimes towardsmigrants, these accounts alsomake clear the ongo-
ing nature of antiimmigrant sentiments and attitudes. This in turn has
implications for migrants' participation in society; as Tomek, a Polish
respondent, noted “bad press” also made people feel “ashamed to show
themselves as Polish” and thus affected their daily lives, as people
would be reluctant to communicate freely in Polish or interact with
their fellow nationals in public places. Similar concerns were echoed
by other Polish respondents, which is unsurprising given that within
the context of EU migration and mobility, “East European” migrants
have been particularly targeted by the British media and politicians,
and “Polish,” as the largest group among these migrants, has become
a generalised and stigmatised category when it comes to hostility
directed at EU migrants. Dunn (2001) describes the denial of “othered”
actors' access in public space as an undermining of citizenship.
Although some dissimulated themselves in public space—a tactic that
Scott (1985) characterises as a “weapon of the weak,” this hostile envi-
ronment provided motivation for others to engage in civil society.6 | ANXIETY, FEAR, AND PANIC
Respondents' strong emotional reactions recorded after the vote
indicated that many did not expect the outcome. Echoing Lulle
et al.'s (2018) study of young EU migrants living in London, some
respondents reacted to Brexit in a profoundly affective way, using a
variety of terms to express themselves such as feeling “sad” or “angry,”
being left “speechless,” being “hit” by it or feeling completely
“shocked” or even “panicked.” Such strong response was particularly
evident in Branca's narrative (a 41‐year‐old Portuguese‐speaking
respondent, living in the UK for 15 years). She found it extremely
difficult to come to terms with the result in the days following the
referendum:Personally the first two days I couldn't speak. Really, I
was shocked. I was really … I don't know. It was worse
than being raped and dumped in a valley. Really that
was the sensation I had. I remember that morning when
I woke up I already had interviews booked with the
Portuguese media and BBC and blah, blah. I couldn't
speak with the BBC I was crying. Really I couldn't
believe my eyes. I was like somebody that you really …
like imagine that you're stressed or … I don't know. I
wasn't expecting that was really going to happen,
especially because we are immigrants.Branca experienced Brexit as a sudden and dramatic change that
generated a great deal of anxiety and uncertainty about her future in
Wales. Other interviewees also spoke at length about how the refer-
endum had affected them emotionally, thus confirming the “affective
impact” of Brexit that has been documented elsewhere (Henley,
2017; Lulle et al., 2018; New Europeans, 2017; Quinn, 2017).
Another consequence of Brexit increasingly discussed is
“Brexodus,” the rising number of EU citizens leaving the United
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that showed a significant increase (29%) in the number of EU nationals
who left the UK between June 2016 and June 2017 (Swinford,
2017; Travis, 2017), amid the uncertainty created by the EU referen-
dum vote and the ongoing negotiations between the U.K. government
and the EU. Although we did not encounter any respondents
who said that they would leave or were planning to leave Wales/UK
during our research, several participants discussed the prospect
of returning “home” or moving to another country. One respondent
talked about her family moving to Scotland, which she saw as
“more open‐minded” with a political discourse more welcoming
of migrants.
Overall, the respondents' reactions to Brexit were notably varied.
Some did not feel that Brexit would have any significant impact on
them and thus were not necessarily thinking about leaving. For exam-
ple, Marek, a 24‐year‐old graduate working in the IT sector who came
to Wales in 2013, felt that for him, “not much had changed”:Nothing changed for my surrounding, for friends. It's like,
okay, it's another news, let's see what happens and still
nothing happens yet. I'm not worrying about it because
… I think that nothing is going to happen for people
who stay here for a longer time, and for younger
students who have decided to come [here] or any other
UK university I think they might find it more challenging.Other respondents also adopted this “wait‐and‐see” approach (Lulle
et al., 2018, p. 8) to Brexit. Many seemed aware of the ongoing
uncertainty and volatility of the situation surrounding the negotiations
between the EU and the U.K. government and how these circum-
stances might change quickly depending on the outcome of these
negotiations. As Norina, a 37‐year‐old Hungarian respondent who
has been living in Wales for much longer than Marek (14 years) put
it, “at the moment the rules are all the same and I'm just trying to keep
calm about it and not panic in advance … we just need to deal with it
one day at a time.”
At the same time, we encountered reactions to Brexit that
differed markedly from those highlighted above. For some, Brexit
seemed to have generated a heightened sense of insecurity and
uncertainty, as a senior representative of an organisation working with
Portuguese nationals in northern Wales described:I fear there is going to be lots of panic here, because
nobody is prepared to move. These people that came
with me 15 years ago they're much older than I am.
They're in their 60s. More, 60 plus. Some of them are
now disabled, become disabled, ill. Life long term
illnesses and they cannot go to work. If they have their
benefits stopped they're going to die, because my
country is not prepared to having all of us back there.
So where are we going to go? What's going to happen?The quotation demonstrates the anxiety and uncertainty facing this
category of older migrants, especially as this involved individuals
who were already facing challenging circumstances due to their illness
or unemployment. The “panic” reaction to Brexit can be seen as a
reflection of their marginal lives and vulnerability.Similar strong reactions also emerged among Czech and Slovak
Roma migrants who “panick” after the referendum, fearing that they
would be a “target” of deportations by British state authorities and
forced to return to their countries of origin. Many had been living in
the area for a relatively long time and settled in with their families. These
concerns were confirmed by a Roma participant who added that such
fears among Roma were based on their existing experiences of local
state authorities, especially those involving social services who seemed
to threaten Roma with “taking their children” away. Another respon-
dent, Ian, referred to “ethnic profiling” of Roma and other marginalised
communities taking place in Wales: “I was speaking to the Gypsy Roma
Traveller Police Association and there were some police forces that
actually have family trees on people, regardless of if you've committed
a crime and you've got ethnic profiling there.” In this context, and given
the notable rise in the number of EU nationals, including, Roma, who
have been deported by British authorities especially since the EU refer-
endum (Bradley, 2017; Townsend, 2017), the rather strong reactions by
Roma migrants, who may have seen Brexit as providing further “pre-
texts” for state authorities to target them seem unsurprising. The further
prospect of being deported to another EU state with entrenched anti‐
Roma attitudes was also troubling them.
The cases discussed above refer to different categories of
migrants whose marginality and “otherness” were further exacerbated
by Brexit. Their experiences point to a reality different from that of
“young and mobile Europeans” who are able to negotiate Brexit by
using various “tactics of belonging” (Lulle et al., 2018) or simply move
on to other countries. By contrast, here, we see individuals who felt in
limbo, found themselves in difficult circumstances, and felt highly
uncertain about their future. Many wanted to stay but felt that Brexit
would eventually force them to leave the country. Moreover, this also
included those who simply had no means to arrange a “return home,”
or to move elsewhere, as one research informant put it, “where should
we go now, we have nowhere to go.”7 | FORMAL AND INFORMAL (NON‐ )
BELONGING
The referendum result created a great deal of uncertainty regarding
respondents' rights as EU citizens. Jennifer, who worked in an organi-
sation that offered support to European migrants living in southern
Wales, explained how their drop‐in service saw a significant rise in
the number of enquiries from individual migrants who had suddenly
become worried about their rights:Recently I've had new people signing up to the service,
but they might have been in Wales for ten years or
eight years and they've never had to use the service,
and they've come because they've come up against an
issue that they don't know how to handle. So they just
come for advice. It's not about form filling for them
because they've got the language skills and they've got
the skills to do that, but it's usually somewhere to do
with rights. Have I got the right to do this or I've been
told I can't get child benefit and is that true, and people
generally I think are concerned about the future.
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that affected a larger group of migrants, that is, not just individuals
that the organisation was routinely engaging with but also those
migrants who had acquired English language skills and seemed to
be getting on well with their lives in Wales. The marked increase in
enquiries concerning legal rights, which was also reported by other
organisations working with EU nationals in Wales, added to the
existing workload of these organisations at a particularly challenging
time: an austerity context with many organisations facing ongoing
difficulties to keep their services and programmes running. The
emergence of these “new problems” clearly demonstrates the
disruption caused by Brexit vis‐à‐vis rights and entitlements associ-
ated with EU citizenship. This finding resonates with other studies
that have documented such impact on EU nationals living elsewhere
in the UK. McGhee et al. (2017) demonstrate that a larger number
of Polish migrants were keener to apply for legal residence and
explore formal pathways to settlement in the UK (e.g., through
naturalisation and citizenship) in the context of Brexit. According
to these authors, this marked a shift in strategy; although
previously Polish migrants relied on legal certainties afforded by EU
citizenship and thus “deliberately” maintained a more “open‐ended
approach” towards settlement, the referendum disrupted this
certainty, compelling them to make “more concrete plans about
their future,” a reorientation described as “undeliberate determinacy”
(p. 2124).
At the same time, the referendum's unsettling impact extended
migrants' concerns around how their settlement and belonging in the
UK would be affected beyond their legal rights. This is well illustrated
by Tomek, a 34‐year‐old who migrated from Poland to the UK in
2002. Unlike other respondents, Tomek had applied for and gained
British citizenship well before the referendum, thus following a more
formal route to settlement in the UK. He applied for citizenship after
considering its benefits, for example, being able to vote in general
elections or for setting up a business in the UK. Yet, rather than feeling
secure in the context of Brexit, the referendum outcome made him
“regret” becoming a British citizen:To be honest when we went to the Referendum recently
I'm very close to enough is enough. You know I find it
very close and I said to a friend of mine, I said do you
know despite I'm actually a British citizen and I really
regret it now. So it made my decision very difficult
because if I wouldn't be I would just pack my bags and
go back. Seriously, this is where I am at the moment.Tomek was more concerned about the overall negative atmosphere in
Britain, influenced by British tabloids' coverage of immigration, than
the actual referendum result. His case highlights again the ongoing
nature of antiimmigration sentiments and a hostile environment. It is
in this context that the referendum prompted Tomek to rethink his
stay in the country; despite having a secured legal position in the UK
and formal membership through acquiring British citizenship, he
clearly felt like he no longer belonged there.
This process of “othering” can also be seen in the case of Emilia, a 38‐
year‐old Polish respondent. Although not a British citizen, Emilia had
spent more than 10 years in Wales and felt settled in the country. Emilialisted a number of changes that she had undergone during this period,
including getting a better job, finding a local partner, and learning how
Welsh/British society functioned, leading her to develop an attachment
to the country. She felt at ease and settled in Wales, but this was now
unsettled by the referendum result, making her feeling like an “outsider”
again: “I haven't felt like an immigrant for a while—the whole EU referen-
dum hit back and made me feel a bit like one again.”
Luciana, a 34‐year‐old Portuguese national, also felt settled in the
UK but the referendum result challenged this feeling and her sense of
identity. Married to an Englishman, Luciana has been living in an
Anglo‐Welsh border town for 16 years and has a daughter who
“speaks only English and doesn't know any Portuguese.” Although
she previously felt “half British and half Portuguese,” Luciana could
no longer identify in this way:I used to feel half British, half Portuguese. Too many years
here. Sixteen years, living ten years in a very English world.
Adjusting to the language. The history of England. All
those sorts. I felt half English, half Portuguese. Not
anymore. Since Brexit I feel that that part of me, I get
quite upset, angry, because I felt I married an Englishman
but it's still not an assurance that I will not be sent
home. So by having that in limbo for me it's a bit … I
spent so many years in this country. Gave so much to
this country. Help with community. It's not all mine, but
theirs too. I've done a lot of charity, and to be forced to
go to home with the possibility that my husband can't
come with me, because that is starting from zero again. I
don't know. I don't know if I will like to do that. It makes
me kind of sad.Clearly, the referendum has disrupted Luciana's identity that had
developed over a number of years, unsettling her sense of self and
belonging. Moreover, it has also impacted on her ongoing volunteering
work and engagement in civil society. Indeed, this aspect applies to other
respondents; all respondents were involved in civil society organisations
and activities in different ways, an engagement that entails a form of
connection and belonging to the society in which they live. As expressed
in Luciana's sadness, Brexit threatens to “undo” much of this incorpora-
tion and integration work that these migrants have done over the years.8 | CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have outlined the complex ways in which the EU
membership referendum impacted EU migrants living in Wales. We
have demonstrated the differentiated and uneven effects and anxi-
eties these migrants have of the referendum and Brexit. Rather than
assuming that European migrants have homogenous experiences, we
outlined several different experiences of different migrants, relating
to their ethnicity, “race”, class, family status, etc. Placing these diverse
respondents' perspectives and experiences at the centre of our analy-
sis, we argued that Brexit amounts to an ongoing process of “othering”
and unsettling. It unsettles EU migrants' attachments and connections,
to both the UK and Wales in general and to localities in particular,
which have been cultivated through diverse formal and informal
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interconnecting strands unsettle these attachments. First, the referen-
dum campaign and its aftermath brought an increase in hostility, phys-
ical, and verbal abuse, often experienced personally or by other people
known to respondents. These experiences of abuse in the immediate
and everyday arena, which forms the basis for many interactions and
encounters, threaten attachments to localities and Wales/UK more
broadly through creating anxieties about belonging and being wanted
and accepted in places. Second, Brexit triggers uncertainties about
legal rights and future conditions on remaining in the UK. Specific vul-
nerable migrant groups, such as Roma or those who are unemployed,
ill, or disabled, have deep‐seated anxieties about being marginalised
further or targeted for deportation, and many respondents were
uncertain about whether family members would be able to join them
in the future. These sociolegal uncertainties, protracted through with-
drawal negotiations, bring further anxieties about the post‐Brexit
future, and onward migration is not necessarily an option for those
who have built their lives and are entwined with communities in the
UK/Wales. Third, our findings show how uncertainties that followed
the referendum not only impacted on our participants' legal rights in
the UK but also affected their emotional attachments and sense of
belonging in Wales. Informal and emotional aspects to settlement thus
exist alongside legal certainties, and as our analysis has demonstrated,
the referendum has already greatly disrupted these affective connec-
tions, regardless of the outcome of the current UK–EU withdrawal
negotiations and of what future rights EU migrants in the UK
will have.
More broadly, the paper contributes to the existing literature on
belonging in various ways. First, our analysis has highlighted the intri-
cate link between formal and informal aspects of belonging and how
the two intertwine in our research participants' experiences. They
emphasise the multiple and complex ways in which people develop
a sense of connectedness to places and localities in which they live
and the significant role that relationships and emotions also play in
this process. Second, and relatedly, our findings also indicate that
belonging is an open‐ended and ongoing process of making and
remaking connections and building and maintaining attachments. It
is fundamentally a “temporal phenomenon” (May, 2016) rather than
a fixed state of being that happens in a somewhat linear fashion, with
an endpoint reached when one feels “at home” somewhere or
“anchored” in a specific place or locality. In this context, as our anal-
ysis has shown, the referendum is significant in that it disrupted this
open‐ended process of belonging in various ways, undermining the
connections, attachments, and relationships that made our research
participants feel at ease in places and communities in which they
lived, and affecting their lives and way they engaged in Welsh and
British society.
Third, these attachments and connections are significant and
should not be dismissed as merely “fleeting” forms of belonging
somewhat associated with mobile and transient individuals, that is,
European migrants. They can be seen as “embedding” or “anchoring”
practices (Grzymala‐Kazlowska, 2018; Ryan, 2018) and demonstrate
that EU migration should not be reduced to understandings that
emphasise transience and unspecified long‐term settlement plans.
Not all migrants are always mobile, as health, family, education,employment, and affective circumstances create connections that
may not be easily or desirably detached. For some, it simply remains
unaffordable to move on and (re)start their lives in their “home” coun-
tries or elsewhere. Care should be taken in reifying flows and lucidity
in accounts of liquid migration, as the accounts of those who may
remain can provide insights on how and why such decisions are taken,
attesting to the complex situations in which migrants consider the
future, where remaining is not necessarily an easy “default” option.
Fourth, the unsettling effect of the referendum that we have
discussed here has also wider implications for social cohesion, commu-
nity relations, and solidarity. The unsettled attachments highlighted
above also disrupt migrants' integration and their participation in local
communities and more broadly in society, as existing connections are
disturbed and may take time and effort to be remade. Efforts will thus
be needed in re‐establishing trust and focuses around which common
identities and values can develop; this will be challenging in a polarised
society where there appears to be little reconciliation around Brexit.
Such unsettling events are not restricted to the UK; similar processes
of “othering” seem to be triggered by anti‐immigration, populist and rac-
ist movements elsewhere in the EU and in theUnited States and present
a significant global challenge for migration scholars.
Future work can contribute to a broader and more nuanced
understanding of Brexit in various ways. For example there is a need
to study the changing attachments migrants have to place as the UK
withdraws from the EU, inquiring into of how broader geopolitical
events are experienced in specific localities. More research is also
required to understand different experiences across the UK, illuminat-
ing areas of different demographic, constitutional, and socio‐economic
contexts. This includes different voting patterns, devolved administra-
tions, linguistic contexts, rural–urban differences, and places that have
“benefitted” or been “left out” from globalisation. Finally, there is a need
to account for the experiences of different migrant groups, including
other EU nationals who may have not been “othered” in the same ways
as those migrants included in this research. As the UK's exit from the EU
approaches, further research is required to understand its varied percep-
tions, experiences, and complexities in full; this paper, through its
nuanced and critical analysis, has hopefully provided a first basis for such
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3 All data have been anonymised in order to prevent identification and to
minimise potential negative consequences for informants; pseudonyms
are used instead for people and more general descriptions are employed




Anderson, B., & Wilson, H. F. (2018). Commentary. Everyday Brexits. Area.
https://doi.org/10.1111/area.12385, 50, 291–295.
Anthias, F. (2016). Interconnecting boundaries of identity and belonging
and hierarchy‐making within transnational mobility studies: Framing
inequalities. Current Sociology, 64(2), 172–190. https://doi.org/
10.1177/0011392115614780
Bauböck, R. (2000). Introduction: Dual and supranational citizenship. Limits
to transnationalism. In T. A. Aleinikoff, & D. Klusmeyer (Eds.), From
migrants to citizens. Membership in a changing world (pp. 305–311).
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Bentley, P., Faulkner, K. and Borland, S. (2015). Ministers order urgent
investigation into “completely unacceptable” revelations foreigners
are charging the NHS for care in their OWN country. The Daily Mail,
9 August. Retrieved from: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article‐
3191557/Foreigners‐charge‐NHS‐care‐country‐Loophole‐lets‐thou-
sands‐migrants‐free‐treatment‐card‐GP.html
Berry, B., Garcia‐Blanco, I., and K. Moore. (2015). Press coverage of the
refugee and migrant crisis in the EU: A content analysis of five Euro-
pean countries. Report prepared for the United Nations high
Commission for Refugees. Retrieved from: http://www.unhcr.org/
56bb369c9.pdf
Blanchflower, D. and Lawton, H. (2008). The impact of the recent expan-
sion of the EU on the UK labour market. IZA discussion paper No.
3695. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labour. Retrieved from: http://
ftp.iza.org/dp3695.pdf
Bourdieu, P. (1992). Language and symbolic power. Polity Press.
Bowater, D. (2010). Now poles get free abortions on NHS, the daily
express, 16 March. Retrieved from: http://www.express.co.uk/news/
uk/163198/Now‐Poles‐get‐free‐abortions‐on‐NHS
Bradley, M. G. (2017). How charities helped to deport homeless migrants.
The Guardian, 22 August. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2017/aug/22/homelessness‐charities‐target‐
migrants‐deportation
Burnett, J. (2017). Racial violence and the Brexit state. Race and Class,
58(4), 85–97. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396816686283
Burrell, K. (2010). Staying, returning, working and living: key themes in
current academic research undertaken in the UK on migration move-
ments from Eastern Europe. Social Identities, 16(3), 297–308. https://
doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2010.482401
Chapman, J. (2013). The TRUE cost of health tourism: Foreigners using
NHS cost Britain up to £2BILLION a year, government report
reveals...up to 100 times more than thought. The Daily Mail, 22October. Retrieved from: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article‐
2470994/TRUE‐cost‐health‐tourism‐Foreigners‐cost‐NHS‐2BN‐year.html
Crawley, H., & Crimes, T. (2009). Refugees living in Wales: A survey of skills,
experiences and barriers to inclusion. Swansea: CMPR Swansea
University.
Dunn, K. M. (2001). Representations of Islam in the politics of mosque
development in Sydney. Tijdschrift voor Economiche Geografie, 92,
291–308.
Eade, J., Drinkwater, S., and Garapich, M. (2006). Class and ethnicity: Polish
migrants in London. Economic and Social Research Council.
Engbersen, G., & Snel, E. (2013). Liquid migration: Dynamic and fluid pat-
terns of post‐accession migration. In B. Glorius, I. Grabowska‐
Lusinska, & A. Rindoks (Eds.), Mobility in transition: Migration patterns
after EU enlargement (pp. 21–40). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University.
Favell, A. (2008). The new face of East–West migration from Europe.
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 34(5), 701–716. https://doi.
org/10.1080/13691830802105947
Ford, R., & Lymperopoulou, K. (2016). Immigration: How attitudes in the
UK compare with Europe. In E. Clery, J. Curtice, & R. Harding (Eds.),
British social attitudes: The 34th report. London: NatCen Social
Research. Retrieved from: www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk
Fox, J. E., Moroşanu, L., & Szilassy, E. (2012). The racialization of the new
European migration to the UK. Sociology, 46, 680–695. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0038038511425558
Fox, J. E. (2016). Brexit adds a twist, but Eastern Europeans have been
maligned for years. The Conversation, 6 July 2016. Retrieved from:
https://theconversation.com/brexit‐adds‐a‐twist‐but‐eastern‐europeans‐
have‐been‐maligned‐for‐years‐62009
Gerard, L. (2016). The press and immigration: Reporting the news or
fanning the flames of hatred? SubScribe, 3 September 2016.. Retrieved
from: http://www.sub‐scribe.co.uk/2016/09/the‐press‐and‐immigra-
tion‐reporting.html
Grzymala‐Kazlowska, A. (2018). From connecting to social anchoring:
Adaptation and ‘settlement’ of Polish migrants in the UK. Journal of
Ethnic and Migration Studies, 44(2), 252–269. https://doi.org/
10.1080/1369183X.2017.1341713
Guma, T. (2018). Turning citizens into immigrants: state practices of wel-
fare ‘cancellations’ and document retention among EU nationals living
in Glasgow. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. (Accepted/In Press,
September 2018).
Gustafson, P. (2009). Mobility and territorial belonging. Environment and
Behaviour, 41(1), 490–508. https://doi.org/10.1177/0013916508314478
Henley, J. (2017). ‘A bit of me is dying. But I can't stay’: The EU nationals
exiting Britain. The Guardian, 18 July. Retrieved from: https://www.
theguardian.com/politics/2017/jul/28/brexit‐the‐eu‐nationals‐exiting‐
britain‐a‐bit‐of‐me‐is‐dying‐but‐i‐cant‐stay
Hough, A. and Whitehead, T. (2011). New Eastern European ‘benefit tour-
ism’ fears after migrant safeguards scrapped. The Telegraph, 3 March
2011. Retrieved from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
europe/eu/8358500/New‐Eastern‐European‐benefit‐tourism‐fears‐
after‐migrant‐safeguards‐scrapped.html
Ipsos Mori (2016). Immigration is now the top issue for voters in the EU
referendum. Ipsos Mori, 16 June 2016. Retrieved from: https://www.
ipsos.com/ipsos‐mori/en‐uk/immigration‐now‐top‐issue‐voters‐eu‐
referendum
Jackson, L., & Dafydd Jones, R. (2014). “We'll keep a welcome in the
hillsides”? Proximity, distance, and hospitality towards migrants in
Wales. Contemporary Wales, 27, 82–104.
Jones, R. D. (2015). Mwslemiaid yn y Gymru wledig: datgysylltiad, ffydd, a
pherthyn. Gwerddon, 19, 9–27.
Lulle, A., Moroşanu, L., & King, R. (2018). And then came Brexit: Experi-
ences and future plans of young EU migrants in the London region.
Population, Space and Place, 24. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2122
Mann, R., & Tommis, Y. (2012). Public sentiments towards immigrants living
in Wales, new ideas social research fund, Wales Institute of Social &
10 of 10 GUMA AND DAFYDD JONESEconomic Research, Data & Methods. Bangor: Bangor University School
of Social Sciences.
May, V. (2016). What does the duration of belonging tell us about the
temporal self? Time & Society, 25(3), 634–651.
McGhee, D., Moreh, C., & Vlachantoni, A. (2017). An “undeliberate deter-
minacy”? The changing migration strategies of Polish migrants in the
UK in times of Brexit. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 43(13),
2109–2130. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1299622
Moskal, M. (2013). Circulating capitals between Poland and Scotland: A
transnational perspective on European labour mobility. International
Migration and Integration, 14, 363–379. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s12134‐012‐0243‐7
Mügge, L. M., & van der Haar, M. (2016). Who is an immigrant and who
requires integration? Categorising in European policies. In B. Garcés‐
Mascareñas, & R. Penninx (Eds.), Integration processes and policies in
Europe: Contexts, levels and actors (pp. 77–90). (IMISCOE research
series)). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 10.1007/978‐3‐
319‐21674‐4_5
New Europeans (2017). “On 23rd June I became an alien.” Brexit—The voice
of EU citizens. European Parliament Hearing, Briefing 11 May 2017. A
moral case and legal case for unilateral guarantees. Retrieved from:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/118364/new‐europeans.pdf
Osmond, J. (1995). Welsh Europeans. Bridgend: Seren.
Pollard, N., Latorre, M., & Sriskandarajah, D. (2008). Floodgates or turnstiles?
Post EU‐enlargement migration flows to (and from) the UK. London:
Institute for Public Policy Research.
Portes, J., & Rumbaut, R. G. (1996). Immigrant America: A portrait (2nd ed.).
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Quinn, B. (2017). Sleepless, anxious, depressed: EU citizens in the shadow
of Brexit. The Guardian, 24 July. Retrieved from: https://www.
theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/24/eu‐citizens‐shadow‐brexit‐sleep-
less‐anxious‐depressed
Robinson, V. (2003). Exploring myths about rural racism: A Welsh case
study. In C. Williams, N. Evans, & P. O'Leary (Eds.), A tolerant nation?
Exploring ethnic diversity in Wales (pp. 99.160–99.178). Cardiff: Univer-
sity of Wales Press.
Robinson, V., & Gardner, H. (2004). Unravelling a stereotype: The lived
experience of black and minority ethnic people in rural Wales. In N.
Chakraborti, & J. Garland (Eds.), Rural racism (pp. 85–107). Cullompton,
Devon: Willan Publishing.
Ryan, L. (2018). Differentiated embedding: Polish migrants in London
negotiating belonging over time. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,
44(2), 233–251. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1341710
Rzepnikowska, R. (2018). Racism and xenophobia experienced by Polish
migrants in the UK before and after Brexit vote. Journal of Ethnic and
Migration Studies. https://doi.org/10.1369/183X.2018.1451308
Scott, J. C. (1985). Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resis-
tance. New Haven: Yale University Press.Swinford, S. (2017). Brexodus quickens: 122,000 EU citizens leave UK as net
migration hits lowest level for three years. The Daily Telegraph, 24
August 2017. Retrieved from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/
08/24/brexodus‐quickens‐migration‐uk‐hits‐lowest‐level‐three‐years/
The AIRE Centre (2017). Deportation of EEA nationals from the United
Kingdom. The AIRE Centre. London: Institute of Advanced Legal Stud-
ies. Retrieved from: http://www.airecentre.org/data/files/resources/46/
AIRE‐Deportation‐of‐EEA‐Nationals‐Agencies.pdf
Townsend, M. (2017). Brussels investigates UK over deported EU citizens
Stewart, The Guardian, 30 September. Retrieved from: https://www.
theguardian.com/politics/2017/sep/30/brussels‐uk‐deported‐eu‐citizens
Travis, A. (2017). Net migration to UK shows largest annual fall since
records began. The Guardian, 30 November. Retrieved from: https://
www.theguardian.com/uk‐news/2017/nov/30/net‐migration‐to‐uk‐shows‐
largest‐annual‐fall‐since‐records‐began
Virdee, S., &McGeever, B. (2017). Racism, crisis, Brexit. Ethnic and Racial Stud-
ies, 41, 1802–1819. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1361544
Weaver, M. (2016). ‘Horrible spike’ in hate crime linked to Brexit vote, Met
police say. The Guardian, 28 September. Retrieved from: https://www.
theguardian.com/society/2016/sep/28/hate‐crime‐horrible‐spike‐brexit‐
vote‐metropolitan‐police?
Welsh Government (2017). Welsh exports. Retrieved from: http://gov.
wales/statistics‐and‐research/welsh‐exports/?lang=en
White, A. (2011). Polish families and migration since EU accession. Bristol:
The Policy Press.
White, A., & Ryan, L. (2008). Polish ‘temporary’ migration: The formation and
significance of social networks. Europe‐Asia Studies, 60(9), 1467–1502.
Williams, C. (2003). Claiming the national: Nation, national identity and
ethnic minorities. In C. Williams, N. Evans, & P. O'Leary (Eds.), A tolerant
nation? Exploring ethnic diversity in Wales (pp. 220–234). Cardiff:
University of Wales Press.
Wimmer, A. (2002). Nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict: Shadows of
modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Winter, A. (2016). Island retreat: On hate, violence and the murder of Jo
Cox. Open Democracy (Online). Retrieved from: https://www.
opendemocracy.net/uk/aaron‐winter/island‐retreat‐on‐hate‐violence‐and‐
murder‐of‐jo‐cox
Wyn Jones, R. (2007). Rhoi Cymru'n Gyntaf: Syniadaeth plaid Cymru. Cardiff:
University of Wales Press.
Wyn Jones, R. (2017). Brexit a hunaniaeth genedlaethol. Barnläkaren, 656.
How to cite this article: GumaT, Dafydd Jones R. “Where are
we going to go now?” European Union migrants' experi-
ences of hostility, anxiety, and (non‐)belonging during Brexit.
Popul Space Place. 2019;25:e2198. https://doi.org/10.1002/
psp.2198
